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Abstract: 
This paper examines the behavior of the regret-averse multinational firm under exchange rate uncertainty. The 
multinational firm simultaneously sells in the home market and exports to a foreign country. We characterize the 
multinational firm's regret-averse preferences by a modified utility function that includes disutility from having chosen 
ex-post suboptimal alternatives. The extent of regret depends on the difference between the actual home currency profit 
and the maximum home currency profit attained by making the optimal production and export decisions had the 
multinational firm observed the true realization of the random spot exchange rate. We show that the conventional results 
that the multinational firm optimally produces less, sells more domestically, and export less abroad under uncertainty 
than under certainty holds if the multinational firm is not too regret averse. Using a simple binary model wherein the 
random spot exchange rate can take on either a low value or a high value with positive probability, we show that the 
multinational firm may optimally produce more, sell less domestically, and export more abroad under uncertainty than 
under certainty, particularly when the multinational firm is sufficiently regret averse and the low spot exchange rate is 
very likely to prevail. 
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1 Introduction
The study of the multinational firm under exchange rate uncertainty has been the sub-
ject of considerable research in decision making under uncertainty (Broll and Zilcha, 1992;
Lien and Wong, 2005; Meng and Wong, 2007; to name just a few). The extant literature
examines the production and export decisions of the multinational firm using the standard
von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility representation. It is shown that the risk-averse
multinational firm optimally produces less, sells more domestically, and exports less abroad
when the exchange rate uncertainty prevails than when the random spot exchange rate is
fixed at the expected value (say via foreign exchange forward/futures trading).
In reality, multinational firms may have desires to avoid consequences wherein ex-post
suboptimal decisions appear to have been made even though these decisions are ex-ante
optimal based on the information available at that time. To account for this consideration,
Bell (1982, 1983) and Loomes and Sugden (1982) propose regret theory that defines regret
as the disutility arising from not having chosen the ex-post optimal alternative, which
is later axiomatized by Quiggin (1994) and Sugden (1993). Regret theory is supported
by a large body of experimental literature that documents regret-averse preferences among
individuals (see, e.g., Loomes, 1988; Loomes et al., 1992; Loomes and Sugden, 1987; Starmer
and Sugden, 1993).
The purpose of this paper is to incorporate regret theory into the study of the multina-
tional firm under exchange rate uncertainty. To this end, we characterize the multinational
firm’s regret-averse preferences by a modified utility function that includes disutility from
having chosen ex-post suboptimal alternatives. The extent of regret depends on the dif-
ference between the actual home currency profit and the maximum home currency profit
attained by making the optimal production and export decisions had the multinational firm
observed the true realization of the random spot exchange rate. We are particularly inter-
ested in examining the impact of regret on the multinational firm’s production and export
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decisions as compared to the benchmark case of certainty.
We show that the multinational firm optimally produces less, sells more domestically,
and exports less abroad under uncertainty than under certainty should the multinational
firm be not too regret averse. In this case, the risk-sharing motive remains first-order
important to the multinational firm. These findings suggest that it is quite possible that
the multinational firm may optimally produce more, sell less domestically, and export more
abroad under uncertainty than under certainty should the multinational firm be sufficiently
regret averse. To verify this conjecture, we develop a binary model wherein the random spot
exchange rate can take on either a low value or a high value with positive probability. In such
a binary framework, we show that the conventional results are violated if the multinational
firm is sufficiently regret averse and the low spot exchange rate is very likely to prevail. In
this case, the optimal levels of domestic sales and foreign exports under certainty are very
close to their counterparts that are ex-post optimal at the low spot exchange rate. The
sufficiently regret-averse multinational firm as such optimally adjusts its level of foreign
exports upward and its level of domestic sales downward so as to limit the potential regret
when the high spot exchange rate is actually revealed, thereby rendering the optimal output
level under uncertainty to exceed that under certainty.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 delineates the model of the
multinational firm under exchange rate uncertainty when the multinational firm’s prefer-
ences exhibit not only risk aversion but also regret aversion. Section 3 solves the model
and provides sufficient conditions under which the behavior of the regret-averse multina-
tional firm is qualitatively the same as that of the risk-averse multinational firm. Section
4 develops a binary model to show the possibility that introducing regret aversion to the
multinational firm may induce the multinational firm to optimally produce more, sell less
domestically, and export more abroad under uncertainty than under certainty. The final
section concludes.
3
2 The model
Consider the multinational firm under exchange rate uncertainty à la Broll and Zilcha
(1992). There is one period with two dates, 0 and 1. To begin, the multinational firm
produces a single commodity in the home country according to a deterministic cost function,
C(Q), where Q ≥ 0 is the output level, and C(Q) is compounded to date 1 with the
properties that C(0) = C ′(0) = 0, and C ′(Q) > 0 and C ′′(Q) > 0 for all Q > 0.1 The
multinational firm commits to selling Q1 units of its output at home and exporting Q2
units to a foreign country, where Q1 ≥ 0, Q2 ≥ 0, and Q1 +Q2 = Q.
The multinational firm’s domestic sales generate home currency revenues at date 1
specified by a deterministic revenue function, R1(Q1), where R1(0) = 0, and R
′
1(Q1) > 0
and R′′1(Q1) < 0 for all Q1 ≥ 0. On the other hand, the multinational firm’s exports
generate foreign currency receives at date 1 specified by another deterministic revenue
function, R2(Q2), where R2(0) = 0, and R
′
2(Q1) > 0 and R
′′
2(Q2) < 0 for all Q2 ≥ 0.
Due to the segmentation of the home and foreign markets, arbitrage transactions are either
impossible or unprofitable, thereby invalidating the law of one price.2
We model the exchange rate uncertainty by a random variable, S̃, that denotes the spot
exchange rate at date 1 and is expressed in units of the home currency per unit of the foreign
currency.3 S̃ is distributed according to a known cumulative distribution function, F (S),
over support [S, S], where 0 < S < S.4 The multinational firm’s home currency profit at
date 1 is given by Π(S̃) = R1(Q1) + S̃R2(Q2)− C(Q1 +Q2).
We define the multinational firm to be regret-averse if its preferences are represented by
1The strict convexity of the cost function reflects the fact that the multinational firm’s production tech-
nology exhibits decreasing returns to scale.
2Engel and Rogers (1996, 2001) and Parsley and Wei (1996) provide supportive evidence that arbitrage
transactions among national markets are indeed imperfect.
3Throughout the paper, random variables have a tilde (∼) while their realizations do not.
4An alternative way to model the exchange rate uncertainty is to apply the concept of information
systems that are conditional cumulative distribution functions over a set of signals imperfectly correlated
with S̃ (Broll et al., 2013).
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the following modified utility function that includes some compensation for regret:
V (Π) = U(Π)− βG(Πmax −Π), (1)
where Π ≥ 0 is the multinational firm’s home currency profit at date 1, U(Π) is a von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function with U ′(Π) > 0 and U ′′(Π) < 0, β ≥ 0 is a constant
regret coefficient, and G(Πmax − Π) is a regret function that depends on the difference
between the actual home currency profit, Π, and the maximum home currency profit, Πmax,
that the multinational firm could have earned if the multinational firm had made the optimal
production and export decisions based on knowing the realized spot exchange rate.5 We
assume that G(0) = 0, and G′(Πmax −Π) > 0 and G′′(Πmax −Π) > 0 for all Πmax −Π ≥ 0.
Since Π cannot exceed Πmax, the multinational firm experiences disutility from forgoing the
possibility of undertaking the ex-post optimal production and export decisions.
To characterize the regret-averse multinational firm’s optimal production and export
decisions, we have to first determine the maximum home currency profit, Πmax. If the
multinational firm could have observed the realized spot exchange rate, S, the maxi-
mum home currency profit would be achieved by choosing Q1(S) and Q2(S) that solve
R′1[Q1(S)] = C
′[Q1(S) + Q2(S)] and SR
′
2[Q2(S)] = C
′[Q1(S) + Q2(S)] simultaneously.
Differentiating Q1(S) and Q2(S) with respect to S yields
Q′1(S) = −
R′2[Q2(S)]C
′′[Q1(S) +Q2(S)]
SR′′1 [Q1(S)]R
′′
2 [Q2(S)]− {R′′1 [Q1(S)] + SR′′2 [Q2(S)]}C ′′[Q(S)]
< 0, (2)
and
Q′2(S) =
R′2[Q2(S)]{C ′′[Q(S)]−R′′1 [Q1(S)]}
SR′′1 [Q1(S)]R
′′
2 [Q2(S)]− {R′′1 [Q1(S)] + SR′′2 [Q2(S)]}C ′′[Q(S)]
> 0, (3)
where Q(S) = Q1(S) + Q2(S). The maximum home currency profit as a function of S is
given by Πmax(S) = R1[Q1(S)] + SR2[Q2(S)]−C[Q1(S) +Q2(S)], which is increasing in S
since Πmax
′
(S) = R2[Q2(S)] > 0.
5Wong (2011, 2012) considers a regret function that depends on the difference between the utility level
of the actual home currency profit and that of the maximum home currency profit, U(Πmax) −U(Π). Since
such a specification is simply a monotonic transformation of ours, none of the qualitative results are affected
if we adopt Wong’s (2011, 2012) approach.
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We can now state the regret-averse multinational firm’s ex-ante decision problem. At
date 0, the multinational firm chooses the levels of domestic sales and exports, Q1 and Q2,
so as to maximize the expected value of its regret-theoretical utility function:
max
Q1≥0,Q2≥0
E{U [Π(S̃)]− βG[Πmax(S̃)−Π(S̃)]}, (4)
where E(·) is the expectation operator with respect to the cumulative distribution function,
F (S). The first-order conditions for program (4) are given by
R′1(Q
∗
1)− C ′(Q∗1 +Q∗2) = 0, (5)
and
E
{
{U ′[Π∗(S̃)] + βG′[Πmax(S̃)−Π∗(S̃)]}[S̃R′2(Q∗2)− C ′(Q∗1 +Q∗2)]
}
= 0, (6)
where an asterisk (∗) indicates an optimal level. The second-order conditions for program
(4) are satisfied given the assumed properties of U(Π), G(Πmax −Π), R1(Q1), R2(Q2), and
C(Q).
3 Impact of regret on production and export decisions
As a benchmark, suppose that the uncertain spot exchange rate, S̃, is fixed at its
expected value, E(S̃). In this benchmark case of certainty, Eqs. (5) and (6) reduce to
R′1(Q
◦
1)− C ′(Q◦1 +Q◦2) = 0, (7)
and
E(S̃)R′2(Q
◦
2)− C ′(Q◦1 +Q◦2) = 0, (8)
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where Q◦1 and Q
◦
2 are the optimal levels of domestic sales and exports, respectively. We are
interested in comparing Q∗1 with Q
◦
1 and Q
∗
2 with Q
◦
2. The following proposition provides
sufficient conditions under which we can make unambiguous comparisons.
Proposition 1. If U ′′′(Π) ≥ 0 and G′′′(Πmax − Π) ≥ 0, then a sufficient condition that
ensures the regret-averse multinational firm to produce less, i.e., Q∗ < Q◦, sells more in
the home market, i.e., Q∗1 > Q
◦
2, and exports less to the foreign country, i.e., Q
∗
2 < Q
◦
2, as
compared to the optimal levels under certainty, is that the constant regret coefficient, β, is
sufficiently small such that
β ≤ U
′{Π◦[E(S̃)]} − U ′[Π◦(S)]
G′[Πmax(S)−Π◦(S)]−G′(0)
, (9)
where Π◦(S) = R1(Q
◦
1) + SR2(Q
◦
2)− C(Q◦1 +Q◦2).
Proof. Let Q1(Q2) be the solution to R
′
1[Q1(Q2)] = C
′[Q1(Q2) +Q2]. Then, Eqs. (5) and
(7) imply that Q1(Q
∗
2) = Q
∗
1 and Q1(Q
◦
2) = Q
◦
1, respectively. Furthermore, we have
Q′1(Q2) =
C ′′[Q1(Q2) +Q2]
R′′1 [Q1(Q2)]− C ′′[Q1(Q2) +Q2]
< 0, (10)
since C ′′(Q) > 0 and R′′1(Q1) < 0. Substituting Q1(Q2) into the objective function of
program (4) and differentiating with respect to Q2 yields
∂E{V [Π(S̃)]}
∂Q2
∣∣∣∣
Q1=Q1(Q2)
= E
{
{U ′[Π̂(S̃)] + βG′[Πmax(S̃)− Π̂(S̃)]}{S̃R′2(Q2)− C ′[Q1(Q2) +Q2]}
}
, (11)
where Π̂(S) = R1[Q1(Q2)] + SR2(Q2)− C[Q1(Q2) +Q2]. Evaluating Eq. (11) at Q2 = Q◦2
yields
∂E{V [Π(S̃)]}
∂Q2
∣∣∣∣
Q1=Q◦1,Q2=Q
◦
2
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= E
{
{U ′[Π◦(S̃)] + βG′[Πmax(S̃)−Π◦(S̃)]}[S̃ − E(S̃)]
}
R′2(Q
◦
2), (12)
where we have used Eq. (8) and Q1(Q
◦
2) = Q
◦
1.
Let Φ(S) = U ′[Π◦(S)] + βG′[Πmax(S)−Π◦(S)]. Differentiating Φ(S) twice with respect
to S yields
Φ′(S) = U ′′[Π◦(S)]R2(Q
◦
2) + βG
′′[Πmax(S)−Π◦(S)]{R2[Q2(S)]−R2(Q◦2)}, (13)
and
Φ′′(S) = U ′′′[Π◦(S)]R2(Q
◦
2)
2 + βG′′′[Πmax(S)−Π◦(S)]{R2[Q2(S)]−R2(Q◦2)}2
+βG′′[Πmax(S)−Π◦(S)]R′2[Q2(S)]Q′2(S). (14)
Since U ′′′(Π) ≥ 0 and G′′′(Πmax−Π) ≥ 0, Eq. (14) implies that Φ′′(S) > 0 for all S ∈ [S, S].
From Eq. (3), we have Q2(S) < (>) Q
◦
2 for all S < (>) E(S̃), it follows from Eq. (13)
that Φ′(S) < 0 for all S ≤ E(S̃). Hence, Φ(S) > Φ[E(S̃)] for all S < E(S̃). Condition
(9) ensures that Φ[E(S̃)] ≥ Φ(S). Since Φ(S) is strictly convex in S and Φ′[E(P̃ )] < 0, it
follows from condition (9) that Φ(S) < Φ[E(S̃)] for all S > E(S̃). The right-hand side of
Eq. (12) as such is negative. It then follows from Eq. (5) and the second-order conditions
for program (4) that Q∗2 < Q
◦
2. From Eq. (10), we have Q
∗
1 > Q
◦
1. Since R
′′
1(Q1) < 0 and
C ′′(Q) > 0, it follows from Eqs. (5) and (7) that Q∗1 +Q
∗
2 < Q
◦
1 +Q
◦
2. 2
The intuition for Proposition 1 is as follows. If β = 0, the firm is purely risk averse.
Broll and Zilcha (1992) show that the risk-averse multinational firm produces less than Q◦,
sells more than Q◦1 domestically, and exports less than Q
◦
2 to the foreign country so as to
limit its exposure to the exchange rate uncertainty. For β sufficiently small, introducing
regret aversion to the multinational firm would not substantially change such a risk-sharing
motive, thereby rendering Q∗ < Q◦, Q∗1 > Q
◦
1, and Q
∗
2 < Q
◦
2.
8
4 A binary model
To gain more insights, we consider in this section a simple binary model such that the
random spot exchange rate, S̃, takes on the low value, S, with probability p and the high
value, S, with probability 1 − p, where 0 < p < 1. In such a binary model, the right-hand
side of Eq. (12) becomes
p{U ′[Π◦(S)] + βG′[Πmax(S)−Π◦(S)]}[S − pS − (1− p)S]R′2(Q◦2)
+(1− p){U ′[Π◦(S)] + βG′[Πmax(S)−Π◦(S)]}[S − pS − (1− p)S]R′2(Q◦2)
= p(1− p)(S − S)R′2(Q◦2)Ψ(p), (15)
where Ψ(p) = U ′[Π◦(S)] + βG′[Πmax(S) − Π◦(S)] − U ′[Π◦(S)] − βG′[Πmax(S) − Π◦(S)]. If
right-hand side of Eq. (15) is negative (positive), i.e., Ψ(p) < (>) 0, it then follows from
Eq. (5) and the second-order conditions for program (4) that Q∗2 < (>) Q
◦
2.
We state and prove the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the random spot exchange rate, S̃, can take on the low value,
S, with probability p and the high value, S, with probability 1 − p, where 0 < p < 1. If the
constant regret coefficient, β, is sufficiently small such that
β ≤ U
′[Πmax(S)]− U ′{R1[Q1(S)] + SR2[Q2(S)]− C[Q(S)]}
G′{Πmax(S)−R1[Q1(S)]− SR2[Q2(S)] + C[Q(S)]} −G′(0)
, (16)
the regret-averse multinational firm optimally produces less, i.e., Q∗ < Q◦, sells more in
the home market, i.e., Q∗1 > Q
◦
1, and exports less to the foreign country, i.e., Q
∗
2 < Q
◦
2, as
compared to the optimal levels under certainty. If β is sufficiently large such that condition
(16) does not hold, there exists a unique value, p∗ ∈ (0, 1), that solves Ψ(p∗) = 0, such that
Q∗ < (>) Q◦, Q∗1 > (<) Q
◦
1, and Q
∗
2 < (>) Q
◦
2, for all p < (>) p
∗.
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Proof. In the binary model, we differentiate Eq. (8) with respect to p to yield
dQ◦2
dp
=
(S − S)R′2(Q◦2)
E(S̃)R′′2(Q
◦
2)− C ′′[Q1(Q◦2) +Q◦2][Q′1(Q◦2) + 1]
< 0, (17)
since R′′2(Q2) < 0, C
′′(Q) > 0, and Eq. (10) implies that Q′1(Q2) + 1 > 0. Differentiating
Ψ(p) with respect to p yields
Ψ′(p) = (S − S)R′2(Q◦2)
dQ◦2
dp
{pU ′′[Π◦(S)]− pβG′′[Πmax(S)−Π◦(S)]
+(1− p)U ′′[Π◦(S)]− (1− p)βG′′[Πmax(S)−Π◦(S)]} > 0, (18)
where the inequality follows from U ′′(Π) < 0, G′′(Πmax − Π) > 0, and Eq. (17). At p = 0,
we have Q◦2 = Q2(S). In this case, Ψ(0) = U
′[Π◦(S)]−U ′[Π◦(S)] +β{G′(0)−G′[Πmax(S)−
Π◦(S)]} < 0 since U ′′(Π) < 0, Π◦(S) > Π◦(S), and G′′(Πmax−Π) > 0. On the other hand, at
p = 1, Q◦2 = Q2(S) and thus Ψ(1) = U
′[Π◦(S)]−U ′[Π◦(S)]+β{G′[Πmax(S)−Π◦(S)]−G′(0)}.
Condition (16) ensures that Ψ(1) ≤ 0. In this case, Eq. (18) implies that Ψ(p) < 0 for all
p ∈ (0, 1) so that Q∗2 < Q◦2. From Eq. (10), we have Q∗1 > Q◦1. Since R′′1(Q1) < 0 and
C ′′(Q) > 0, it follows from Eqs. (5) and (7) that Q∗1 +Q
∗
2 < Q
◦
1 +Q
◦
2.
If condition (16) does not hold, we have Ψ(1) > 0. It then follows from Eq. (18) that
there exists a unique point, p∗ ∈ (0, 1), such that Ψ(p) < (>) 0 for all p < (>) p∗. Hence,
in this case, we have Q∗2 < (>) Q
◦
2, thereby Q
∗
1 > (<) Q
◦
1 and Q
∗
1 +Q
∗
2 < (>) Q
◦
1 +Q
◦
2, for
all p < (>) p∗. 2
The intuition for Proposition 2 is as follows. If condition (16) holds, we have Q∗ < Q◦,
Q∗1 > Q
◦
1, and Q
∗
2 < Q
◦
2, which are consistent with the results of Proposition 1. We now
consider the case that condition (16) does not hold. When S is very likely to be seen at
date 1, Q◦2 is closer to Q2(S) and further way from Q2(S). Introducing regret aversion,
which is sufficiently severe, to the multinational firm makes the firm take into account
the substantial disutility from the large discrepancy of its export level, Q◦2 − Q2(S), when
the low spot exchange rate is revealed. To avoid regret, the regret-averse multinational
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firm optimally adjusts its export level downward from Q◦2 to move closer to Q2(S) so that
Q∗2 < Q
◦
2 when p is small. On the other hand, when S is very likely to be seen at date 1, in
this case Q◦2 is close to Q2(S). The regret-averse multinational firm as such optimally adjusts
its export level upward from Q◦2 to reduce the discrepancy of its export level, Q2(S)−Q∗2,
when the high spot exchange rate is revealed. Hence, we have Q∗2 > Q
◦
2 when p is large.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we incorporate regret theory into the study of the multinational firm
under exchange rate uncertainty. The multinational firm simultaneously sells in the home
market and exports to a foreign country. We characterize the multinational firm’s regret-
averse preferences by a modified utility function that includes disutility from having chosen
ex-post suboptimal alternatives. The extent of regret depends on the difference between the
actual home currency profit and the maximum home currency profit attained by making
the optimal production and export decisions had the multinational firm observed the true
realization of the random spot exchange rate. We show that the conventional results of the
extant literature that the multinational firm optimally produces less, sells more domestically,
and exports less abroad when the exchange rate uncertainty prevails than when the random
spot exchange rate is fixed at the expected value should the multinational firm be not too
regret averse. These findings suggest that it is possible that the multinational firm may
optimally produces more, sells less domestically, and exports more abroad under uncertainty
than under certainty. We verify such a conjecture by using a simple binary model wherein
the random spot exchange rate can take on either a low value or a high value with positive
probability. We show that the non-conventional results hold in the binary model if the
multinational firm is sufficiently regret averse and the low spot exchange rate is very likely to
prevail. Regret aversion as such plays a distinctive role, vis-à-vis risk aversion, in shaping the
production and export decisions of the multinational firm under exchange rate uncertainty.
11
References
Bell, D. E., 1982. Regret in decision making under uncertainty. Operations Research 30,
961–981.
Bell, D. E., 1983. Risk premiums for decision regret. Management Science 29, 1156–1166.
Broll, U., Eckwert, B., Wong, K. P., 2013. Transparency and risk sharing in international
trade. The Manchester School, in press.
Broll, U., Zilcha, I., 1992. Exchange rate uncertainty, futures markets and the multinational
firm. European Economic Review 36, 815–826.
Engel, C., Rogers, J. H., 1996. How wide is the border? American Economic Review 86,
1112–1125.
Engel, C., Rogers, J. H., 2001. Violating the law of one price: should we make a Federal
case out of it? Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 33, 1–15.
Lien, D., Wong, K. P., 2005. Multinationals and futures hedging under liquidity constraints.
Global Finance Journal 16, 210–220.
Loomes, G., 1988. Further evidence of the impact of regret and disappointment in choice
under uncertainty. Economica 55, 47–62.
Loomes, G., Starmer, C., Sugden, R., 1992. Are preferences monotonic—testing some
predictions of regret theory. Economica 59, 17–33.
Loomes, G., Sugden, R., 1982. Regret theory: an alternative theory of rational choice under
uncertainty. Economic Journal 92, 805–824.
Loomes, G., Sugden, R., 1987. Testing for regret and disappointment in choice under
uncertainty. Economic Journal 97, 118–129.
Meng, R., Wong, K. P., 2007. Currency hedging for multinationals under liquidity con-
straints. Journal of Multinational Financial Management 17, 417–431.
12
Parsley, D. C., Wei, S. J., 1996. Convergence to the law of one price without trade barriers
or currency fluctuations. Quarterly Journal of Economics 111, 1211–1236.
Quiggin, J., 1994. Regret theory with general choice sets. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
8, 153–165.
Starmer, C., Sugden, R., 1993. Testing for juxtaposition and event-splitting effects. Journal
of Risk and Uncertainty 6, 235–254.
Sugden, R., 1993. An axiomatic foundation of regret. Journal of Economic Theory 60,
159–180.
Wong, K. P., 2011. Regret theory and the banking firm: the optimal bank interest margin.
Economic Modelling 28, 2483–2487.
Wong, K. P., 2012. Production and insurance under regret aversion. Economic Modelling
29, 1154–1160.
13

 
 
 
 
Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 
 
11/09 Rudolph, Stephan: The Gravity Equation with Micro-Founded Trade Costs 
12/09 Biswas, Amit K.: Import Tariff Led Export Under-invoicing: A Paradox 
13/09 Broll, Udo / Wahl, Jack E.: Mitigation of Foreign Direct Investment – Risk and Hedging 
14/09 Broll, Udo / Wahl, Jack E.: Güterwirtschaftliches Risikomanagement: - Ein Entscheidungsmodell zur 
Lagerpolitik bei Unsicherheit 
15/09 Lukas, Daniel: Efficiency Effects of Cross-Border Medical Demand 
16/09 Broll, Udo / Bieta, Volker / Milde, Hellmuth / Siebe, Wilfried: Strategic Pricing of Financial Options 
16/09 Broll, Udo / Bieta, Volker / Milde, Hellmuth / Siebe, Wilfried: Strategic Pricing of Financial Options 
17/09 Broll, Udo / Wahl, Jack E.: Liquidity Constrained Exporters: Trade and Futures Hedging 
01/10 Rudolph, Stephan: Estimating Gravity Equations with Endogenous Trade Costs 
02/10 Lukas, Daniel / Werblow, Andreas: Grenzen der Spezialisierung grenzüberschreitender 
Gesundheitsversorgung im Rahmen des Heckscher-Ohlin Modells 
03/10 Broll, Udo / Roldán-Ponce, Antonio / Wahl, Jack E.: Spatial Allocation of Capital: The Role of Risk 
Preferences 
04/10 Broll, Udo / Wong, Keith P.: The Firm under Uncertainty: Capital Structure and Background Risk 
05/10 Broll, Udo / Egozcue, Martín: Prospect Theory and Hedging Risks 
06/10 Biswas, Amit K. / Sengupta, Sarbajit: Tariffs and Imports Mis-invoicing under Oligopoly 
07/10 Lukas, Daniel: Patient Autonomy and Education in Specific Medical Knowledge 
08/10 Broll, Udo / Eckwert, Bernhard / Wong, Pong K.: International Trade and the Role of Market 
Transparency 
09/10 Kemnitz, Alexander: A Simple Model of Health Insurance Competition 
10/10 Lessmann, Christian / Markwardt, Gunther: Fiscal federalism and foreign transfers: Does inter-
jurisdictional competition increase foreign aid effectiveness? 
01/11 Tscharaktschiew, Stefan / Hirte, Georg: Should subsidies to urban passenger transport be 
increased? A spatial CGE analysis for a German metropolitan area 
02/11 Hirte, Georg / Tscharaktschiew, Stefan: Income tax deduction of commuting expenses and tax 
funding in an urban CGE study: the case of German cities 
03/11 Broll, Udo / Eckwert, Bernhard: Information value, export and hedging 
04/11 Broll, Udo / Wong, Kit Pong: Cross-hedging of correlated exchange rates 
05/11 Broll, Udo / Eckwert, Bernhard / Eickhoff, Andreas: Transparency in the Banking Sector 
01/12 Broll, Udo / Roldán-Ponce, Antonio / Wahl, Jack E.: Regional investment under uncertain costs of 
location 
02/12  Broll, Udo / Pelster, Matthias / Wahl, Jack E.: Nachfrageunsicherheit und Risikopolitik im Duopol 
03/12  Wobker, Inga / Lehmann-Waffenschmidt, Marco / Kenning, Peter / Gigerenzer, Gerd: What do 
people know about the economy? A test of minimal economic knowledge in Germany  
01/13 Kemnitz, Alexander / Thum, Marcel: Gender Power, Fertility, and Family Policy 
02/13 Ludwig, Alexander: Sovereign risk contagion in the Eurozone: a time-varying coefficient approach 
01/14 Broll, Udo / Wong, Kit Pong: Ambiguity and the Incentive to Export 
02/14 Broll, Udo / Wong, Kit Pong: The impact of inflation risk on forward trading and production 
03/14 Broll, Udo / Jauer, Julia: How International Trade is affected by the Financial Crisis: The Gravity 
Trade Equation 
04/14 Broll, Udo / Welzel, Peter / Wong, Kit Pong: Multination Firm, Exchange Rate Risk and the Impact 
of Regret on Trade 
 
 
 
